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Abstract 
 
  
We analyze the interconnection between the sovereign and banking sector 
risk in the peripheral euro area countries over the 2004Q4-2013Q2 period. 
Applying the contingent claims methodology, we build indicators of 
sovereign and banking sector risk (incorporating both market and balance 
sheet based information) and assess their interconnection in comparison 
with existing market-based indicators of banking and sovereign distress. We 
use three different statistical measures of interconnection based on principal 
components analysis, Granger causality network and Diebold-Yilmaz's 
connectedness index, and apply them to quarterly credit risk data. The 
empirical results shows strong connectedness and comovement between 
country-level banking and sovereign risk indicators. We find evidence of bi-
directional bank-sovereign linkage for Spain and Italy during the European 
sovereign debt crisis period. For the late crisis period, we find weak 
interconnection and more divergence across the various risk indicators. Our 
findings also suggest that secondary and derivatives market indices are 
more driven by common underlying factors than are contingent claim based 
risk measures. 
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1. Introduction
The European sovereign debt crisis, which started in late 2009, raised serious concerns
about the negative feedback loop between sovereign and bank credit risk. The risk was espe-
cially pronounced in peripheral euro area countries, where banks and sovereign CDS spreads
started to follow each other very closely. One reason for this increased interconnection was
the fear of the development of vicious cycle in which sovereign fragility would jeopardize
the asset side of the banks’ balance sheet. In turn, bank distress would increase the explicit
and implicit bail-out costs for sovereigns, which would endanger public finances and raise
questions about their debt sustainability (see Farhi and Tirole (2017), Acharya et al. (2014),
Alter and Schu¨ler (2012) among others).
However, there exist some irreconcilable differences between empirical researchers regard-
ing the underlying nature of the sovereign-banking nexus observed. Comparing the sovereign
risk of the UK and Spain, De Grauwe (2012) notes the higher default risk premium on gov-
ernment bonds in Spain than in the UK, even though the UK faces less favorable sovereign
debt and deficit dynamics and a comparable banking sector risk. De Grauwe argues that
this difference in the evaluation of the sovereign default risks is related to the fact that
Spain belongs to a monetary union, while the UK does not and therefore has control over
the currency in which it issues its debt. This loss of control over the currency makes euro
area countries and banks equally dependent on the European Central Bank in times of crisis,
thus increasing the linkages between banks and sovereign risk.
Another plausible reason is the ‘wake-up call’ hypothesis (Goldstein (1998)), according
to which a crisis alerts international investors to the need to reassess the creditworthiness of
all borrowers. This makes market participants price the same fundamentals differently over
time. Comparing the drivers of sovereign risk for 31 advanced and emerging countries, Beirne
and Fratzscher (2013) show sharp rises in the sensitivity of financial markets to fundamentals
as the main explanation for the rise in sovereign risk between 2008 and 2011, not only for
euro area countries but globally. They also note the substantial and sustained differences in
the pricing of fundamentals for sovereign risk among euro area peripheral countries before
and during the crisis (see also Go´mez-Puig et al. (2014)), suggesting the presence of multiple
equilibria in this relationship.
In this paper we try to broaden our understanding of the sovereign-bank linkages by
statistically assessing the contagion and amplification mechanisms, without taking a clear
stand on the causes of the increasing/decreasing interconnection; we are more concerned
with the identification of bi-directional linkages between the sovereign and the banking
sector and with quantifying the magnitude of that spillover from one part of the system to
another and its resulting impact. Our aim is twofold: (1) To quantify the interconnection
between banking and sovereign risk; and (2) To document the time-varying nature of these
linkages.
We use three different econometric techniques to uncover the underlying interconnection
structure in the data and apply them to the quarterly bank and sovereign risk indicators.
Our primary credit risk indicator is the contingent claim model-based distance-to-default
(DtD) measure for banks and sovereigns. To check the robustness of our results, we use
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two other banking and sovereign risk indicators based on the secondary market (sovereign
yield spreads and banking sector equity return) and the derivatives market (banking sector
average CDS spreads and sovereign CDS spreads). The econometric techniques we use
are: principal component analysis, pairwise Granger causality, and Diebold and Yilmaz’s
connectedness index. Principal component analysis is used to analyze the interrelationships
between the sovereign and the banking sector and to explain these variables in terms of a
smaller number of variables with a minimum loss of information. Pairwise Granger causality
is applied to identify and quantify the bidirectional bank-sovereign network linkages. Finally,
the framework proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012, 2014) is used to examine the
directional spillovers emanating from each market. Due to data restrictions, our sample
spans the period from 2004Q4 to 2013Q2 (i.e., 35 observations) - including four years of the
pre-crisis period as well as the peak of the European sovereign debt crisis episode.1
While acknowledging the achievements of various studies that identify the sources of
systemic risk, we have nonetheless detected a gap in the literature. First, by incorporating
the role of multilateral creditors to measure sovereign risk using publicly available data,
we try to fill this gap within the framework of the existing theoretical models. Secondly,
we quantify the magnitude and direction of interconnection between banking and sovereign
risk measures using three alternative risk indicators to provide robust evidence to support
or refute previous findings. The idea of interconnection here is not directly related to any
grand unifying theory. We assess the interconnection using a variety of statistical measures
without imposing any restriction on the dynamics. An exhaustive summary of all plausible
reasons for direct and indirect interconnection are presented in Section 3.
Our results suggest that the banking and sovereign credit risk are highly interconnected
during the time period we study. Also, there is clear evidence of an increasing role of id-
iosyncratic risk factors driving the evolution of all the risk indices in the post-crisis period,
thus supporting the claims by Beirne and Fratzscher (2013). Country-wise analysis of time-
varying bi-directional Granger causal linkages suggest the development of bank-sovereign
doom loop only in Spain during the European sovereign debt crisis period. This result is
in line with the findings of Singh et al. (2016) where a two-way negative feedback between
banks and sovereign risk was also detected using sovereign yield spreads and banking sector
average DtD data. The analyses based on Diebold-Yilmaz’s connectedness index suggest
that increased risk is being driven away from market-based indices to DtD indicators, sug-
gesting that contingent claim based DtD indices capture the balance-sheet based uncertainty
and vulnerabilities more precisely.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a simple framework
for an overview of the idea of interconnection. Section 3 explains the channels via which
interconnections arise between sovereign and bank risk with a brief review of the related
literature. Section 4 describes the credit risk indicators used in our empirical analysis of
the interconnections. Section 5 explains the econometric methodology used to assess the
interconnections between the bank and sovereign risk indicators. Section 6 presents the
1Since our sample ends in 2013Q2, we will not be able to disentangle the effect of the European Central
Bank’s (ECB’s) actions on the sovereign-bank interconnection.
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empirical findings, whilst Section 7 offers some concluding remarks.
2. Interconnection between sovereign and banking institutions: A simple con-
ceptual framework
Let us start with a simple conceptual framework to understand the idea of intercon-
nection. Figure 1 shows the stylized balance sheet of a financial institution and its direct
inter-linkages with the sovereign balance sheet. The figure is purely schematic and is not
intended to indicate the relative magnitudes of the various parts of the balance sheet. Bank
A has three categories of assets - (1) Treasury securities: the banks’ total exposure to all
treasury securities issued by various sovereigns. Generally, a large part of treasury securities
consists of the securities issued by the domestic sovereign (here sovereign A), where the
bank is based (home bias); (2) Loans to the real economy: exposures outside the financial
network, consisting of claims on non-financial entities, such as mortgages and commercial
loans; and (3) Claims on other banks: in-network assets claim on other banks, including the
interbank loans and exposures through derivatives.
[Figure 1 about here.]
The bank’s liabilities include obligations to depositors, other financial entities and bank’s
equity holders. Bank deposits in most countries are guaranteed by deposit insurance corpo-
rations (either public or private). The interbank obligations arise as a mechanism for banks
to manage their liquidity risk and perform maturity transformation. This network serves
as a risk-sharing mechanism for banks. However, some of these links become vulnerable in
times of crisis and work as channels via which problems are amplified within the network.
Bank equity is the owner’s capital and is of great interest to regulators. It is kind of skin-
in-the-game of promoters and shareholders of the bank. The sovereign liabilities consist of -
Treasury securities issued by the sovereign and explicit/implicit guarantees provided by the
government on domestic banks’ liabilities.
2.1. Why does financial interconnection arise? Channels of interconnection
Consider N financial institutions indexed by i which are distributed across M countries
indexed by j (M < N). Consider a financial institution i, having a risk exposure xi,
based in country j. Assume that fractions αij (j ∈ 1, 2, ..,M) of this exposure are directly
concerned with the credit worthiness of various countries. Then the home sovereign exposure
(home bias) in i’s portfolio will be given by αijxi, while the total sovereign exposure will be
(
∑M
j=1 αij)xi.
2 Home exposure is extremely important in assessing the health of the banks’
assets. Higher home bias will make banking sector assets extremely sensitive to government
health. On the other hand, the high foreign sovereign exposure will diversify the sovereign
risk exposure for banks but will provide the incentive for governments to collude if there is a
looming threat of bank failure. If the fate of a country’s banks is strongly intertwined with
2The total foreign sovereign exposure will be given by (
∑
n∈M,n6=j αin)xi.
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the health of a neighbouring country, this country will be more supportive of any external
interventions to support its neighbour. This may have been the case in the Greek bailout,
since there was some exposure to Greece, especially within the German and French banking
sectors (Ardagna and Caselli (2014)).
Another factor in the banks’ exposure concerns the risk factors idiosyncratic to i. These
are risk exposure which is direct exposure of banks to their home country’s real sector.
Let’s denote by βi the fraction of total bank exposure idiosyncratic to i. The idiosyncratic
exposure of institution i will then be given by βixi. The sum of idiosyncratic exposure of
all banks based in country j,
∑
i∈j βixi will be the amount of credit available in country
j. If the amount of available credit contracts, the government might have to step in (we
might observe higher unemployment) thus placing a strain on government finances. The
government has a choice to bail out either the banks or the real sector directly.
The last factor in the bank exposure is the in-network assets. These are direct ‘links’
among financial institutions, for instance, interbank loans or derivatives, given by the N×N
matrix B, whose elements bik denote how much bank i is exposed to bank k.
Note that, the sum of the individual component of bank i’s exposure will equal to 1.
Mathematically,
M∑
j=1
αij + βi +
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
bik = 1
Similarly, the total exposure of banks to sovereign j (Ej) will be given by
Ej =
N∑
i=1
αijxi
Assuming that the returns on the sovereign exposure, idiosyncratic factor and in-network
assets for bank i are ρs+s, ρi+i and ρn+n respectively, where ρs, ρi and ρn are constants,
while s, i and n are independently distributed random variables with zero mean. We can
define the benchmark payoff pii as what i would receive and we can write it in general as
pii(ρs, ρi, ρn, s, i, n). For illustration, a simple specification could be:
pii = (ρs + s)
M∑
j=1
αijxi + (ρi + i)βixi + (ρn + n)
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
bikxi
However, since the fate of countries j and bank i are intertwined and i also depends on
a system of financial institutions via interlinked claims, its actual pay-off differs from pii in
case of crisis. In the following section, we review the literature of models explaining the
reasons for this variation.
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3. Literature: Direct and indirect linkages between sovereigns and banks
3.1. Sovereign-bank linkage
Sovereign and banks have direct linkages via the bank’s asset holding channel. Banks
hold sovereign debt which makes them vulnerable to the sovereign’s deteriorating fiscal fun-
damentals. Bank distress leading to explicit or implicit government support jeopardizes gov-
ernment finances and its debt sustainability conditions. Indirectly, sovereign debt provides
a credit ceiling for domestic banks. Also, the worsening creditworthiness of the sovereign
squeezes the fiscal space, leading to deteriorating economic activity that indirectly impacts
banks’ lending. Hence, in times of crisis, banks and sovereign default risk start moving in
locksteps (see Figure 2). Here we will touch upon some of the most recent empirical con-
tributions made in this area by Acharya et al. (2014), De Marco and Macchiavelli (2016),
Ongena et al. (2016), Altavilla et al. (2016), Kallestrup et al. (2016) and Horva´th et al.
(2015).
[Figure 2 about here.]
Using CDS spreads on European sovereigns and banks for the period 2007-11, Acharya
et al. (2014) finds empirical evidence to support the bi-directional negative feedback loop
between banking and sovereign credit risk during the recent crisis. They also show that
bailouts triggered the rise of sovereign credit risk and find evidence for the widening of
sovereign spreads, and the narrowing of banking spreads, after a bailout. De Marco and
Macchiavelli (2016) and Horva´th et al. (2015) show that the bank-sovereign nexus was
strongly driven by the moral suasion according to which government-owned banks or banks
with politicians on their boards of directors displayed higher home bias and purchased
more domestic sovereign debt than did privately-owned banks throughout the 2010-2013
period. They also find the moral suasion to be stronger in countries under stress and where
sovereign debt is risky. Using propriety data on banks’ monthly securities holdings, Ongena
et al. (2016) also show that in times of crisis, European banks in fiscally stressed countries
increase their holdings of domestic sovereign bonds in months with relatively high domestic
sovereign bond issuance. The effect was also stronger for state-owned banks. Investigating
monthly data for 226 European banks from 2007 to 2015, Altavilla et al. (2016) show that the
publicly owned, recently bailed out and less strongly capitalized banks reacted to sovereign
stress by increasing their domestic sovereign holdings more than other banks, suggesting
that their choices were affected both by moral suasion and by yield-seeking. Their exposures
significantly amplified the transmission of risk from the sovereign and its impact on lending.
By constructing a simple risk-weighted measure of foreign exposures of banking systems
in 17 countries, Kallestrup et al. (2016) show that the foreign asset holdings of the largest
banks are an important determinant not only of their own CDS premiums but also of the
CDS premium of the sovereign in which the banks reside. Thus, banks’ foreign sovereign debt
holdings not only impact the banks’ own credit risk but also transfer the risk partially to their
own sovereigns. The exact opposite is also observed. Studying the relation between bank
stock returns from EU countries and the returns on sovereign CDS of peripheral countries
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for 2010 to 2012, Beltratti and Stulz (2015) found the relationship to be negative. Using
days with tail sovereign CDS returns of peripheral countries to identify the effects of shocks
to the cost of borrowing of these countries on EU banks from other countries, they found
that the CDS tail return has a greater effect on banks with greater exposure to the country
experiencing that return, but it also has an impact on banks that were not exposed. More
pervasive shocks to peripheral countries have a stronger impact on the returns of banks
from countries that experience no shock more than do shocks to small individual peripheral
countries.
3.2. Bank-bank linkage
Direct bank linkages arise from the network of bi-directional claims that banks hold
against each other (as shown in Figure 1). These network connections usually have positive
effects as they diversify the risk exposure of individual banks. However, they also open
channels through which negative shocks can spread throughout the system. The rest of
this subsection explains the channels via which negative shocks propagate in our current
financial system.
i. Direct loss spillovers through default: Imagine an entity that has sold guar-
antees in the form of Credit Default Swaps and reneges on its contractual obligation
at the payment date. In this case, the default of this entity can bring down all its
counterparties, causing cascading losses and collapses throughout the financial system
(e.g., the case of AIG in the summer of 2008). Eisenberg and Noe (2001) provided the
basic network model that became the backdrop for much subsequent work on contagion
in financial networks.
ii. Mark-to-market loss: Losses in the financial network can spread from one node to
another through changes in the market value of underlying assets. When market prices
drop, financial intermediaries need to liquidate their assets in order to meet funding
and collateral constraints. These new sales amplify the downturn, leading to further
sales, and so on, leading to a self-reinforcing liquidity crisis. Allen and Gale (2004),
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Diamond and Rajan (2005) present different
mechanisms via which this can affect market conditions.
iii. Funding run: When short-term funding becomes scarce, the financial institutions
which have high dependence on short-term funding find it extremely difficult to rapidly
adjust to the new situation. This creates fear among market participants who start to
hoard excess liquidity as a precautionary measure, leading to further liquidity short-
age - as happened during the days following the Lehman bankruptcy. Heider et al.
(2015) provide evidence of interbank market freeze during the 2008 financial crisis while
Acharya et al. (2011) does so for the case of repo markets.
iv. Information contagion: A disclosure by one bank regarding its assets may lead
creditors to make inferences about the assets held by other banks, producing “infor-
mation contagion.” If one bank is forced to sell illiquid assets and in so doing drives
down the price of these assets, then other banks holding similar assets incur fire-sale
externalities through the price drop (see Chen (1999), Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008b),
Aghion et al. (2000) and Acharya and Thakor (2016)).
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v. Contagion through correlation: Shock outside a particular asset class can force
banks to sell their most liquid securities in order to raise cash quickly. This transfers the
negative shock from a less liquid asset class to highly liquid market securities. Other
market participants observing this sale can join in the sell-off, and this pattern can
continue for a few days. Khandani and Lo (2011) document this rapid deleveraging for
quant hedge funds in August 2008. Note that these are not conventional fire sale, as
the assets sold are highly liquid.
vi. Common exposure: Banks expose themselves to the same risk by investing in similar
assets. This may be due to the negative externalities arising from the failure of another
bank (see Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008b); Acharya (2009)) or the herding behaviour
generated by the financial regulations as shown in Farhi and Tirole (2012) and Acharya
and Yorulmazer (2008a).
3.3. Sovereign-sovereign linkage
Sovereigns are not directly linked to each other. However, in times of crisis, they do
coordinate and support each other by providing foreign currency credit lines to central
banks in order to mitigate tensions arising in the foreign currency markets. Sovereigns
implicitly guarantee these foreign currency loans. An indirect way in which sovereigns might
be connected is the ‘wake-up call’ hypothesis suggested by Goldstein (1998). Since financial
markets become more sensitive to market fundamentals in times of crisis, the system moves
to a new equilibrium where the same risk is priced differently (see Beirne and Fratzscher
(2013)).
4. Bank and sovereign risk indicators: Data and preliminary analysis
To measure the vulnerability of banks and sovereigns, we use the contingent claims
literature and derive a set of credit risk indicators. To validate our results, we compare
them with other market-based indicators of bank and sovereign risks. The variables and
data sources are summarized in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here.]
4.1. Banking sector risk measures
To assess the banking sector risk in each individual country, we use three different bank
risk measures. Two of them are standard market-based measures, while the third one is
based on both market and balance sheet based information. The rest of the subsection
enumerates them in greater detail.
4.1.1. Banking sector average DtD (BankDtD)
Based on the contingent claim literature pioneered by Black and Scholes (1973) and
Merton (1974), we use DtD as the bank risk indicator. Its foundation lies in the isomorphic
relationship between equity and call options. Since equity is a junior claim to debt, it can
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be modelled as a European call option on the firms’ assets (A) with an exercise price equal
to the face value of debt (D).
Calculation method: Consider a bank having simple capital structure with N shares of
common stock (market capital E) and all debt denominated as zero coupon bonds (market
value F , maturity T ). Using value conservation equation:
A = E + F (1)
Assuming that the assets returns follow Generalized Brownian Motion, the Black-Scholes
option pricing formula yields:
E = AN(d1)− e−rTDN(d2) (2)
where,
• N(∗) is the cumulative normal distribution;
• r is the risk-free rate under risk-neutrality;
• d1 = ln(
A
D
)+(r+0.5σ2A)T
σA
√
T
; and d2 = d1 − σA
√
T .
Applying Ito’s Lemma, the asset volatility (σA) can be linked with equity volatility (σE)
as:
σE = N(d1)
A
E
σA (3)
Inverting Eqs. 2 and 3 and numerically solving for A and σA yields the T periods ahead
DtD as:
DtD =
A−D
σAA
(4)
Once individual banks’ DtD are calculated, following Harada et al. (2010), we consider
the banking sector risk as the simple average of individual DtD (BankDtD) of all banks
headquartered in a particular country. For a detailed description of the calculation method-
ology, see Singh et al. (2015). DtD can be interpreted as the number of standard deviations
the asset value of the bank is away from the debt threshold. The closer it is to zero, the
closer the firm is to distress.
The sample selection methodology is as follows. First, an exhaustive list of all listed
and delisted monetary financial institutions is selected from the Bankscope3 database. Only
banks whose shares were publicly listed and traded between the last quarter of 2004 till
the second quarter of 2013 and are headquartered in peripheral euro area countries are
selected. Finally, credit institutions which are pure-play insurance, pension or mortgage
banks are removed. To formalize this decision, we use Datastream as an additional source
of information. The main reason for this exclusion is the difference in liability structure and
business model compared to banks. However, this doesn’t mean that they are less risky to
3It provides a comprehensive balance sheet data for financial companies.
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the financial system. The market-based data include daily observations of risk-free interest
rates, daily stock price and total outstanding share in public. For our analysis, we compute
DtD at the quarterly frequency. The variables and data sources are summarized in Table
2, while Table 3 lists the name of banks considered in the analysis.
[Table 2 about here.]
[Table 3 about here.]
Computation of individual DtD: DtD is not measured directly; it is recovered implicitly
from the balance sheet and market price of a firm’s liabilities. In practical terms, this
means that the balance sheet information has to be modified from its original quarterly,
half-yearly, or in rare cases, yearly frequencies using cubic spline interpolation. In addition,
the real debt contracts are not all written with a single terminal date. To overcome this
problem, a common procedure used by Moody’s KMV (Vasicek (1984)), and also applied
here, is to adopt a one-year horizon (T = 1), but to weight longer-term debt (maturity > 1
year) at only 50% of face value. The debt barrier (D) will then be equal to the face value of
short-term liabilities plus half of the long-term liabilities. The equity value of the firm (E) is
computed as the quarterly average of daily market capitalization (number of common shares
× share prices) while quarterly historical volatility based on daily log-returns is taken as
equity volatility (σE). The individual DtD is then calculated using the procedure outlined
in Singh et al. (2015).
4.1.2. Banks average CDS spreads (BankCDS)
Based on the derivatives market, we use banks 5-year CDS daily mid-quotes from Datas-
tream for all banks headquartered in the five peripheral euro area economies, namely Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Following previous studies, we focus on the 5-year ma-
turity for senior unsecured debt, as these contracts are regarded as the most liquid in the
market. The time series of bank CDS spreads for each country was created by averaging
individual bank CDS spreads at the country level. We have an overall sample of 25 banks
spread across the five countries for which CDS data were available in Datastream (see Table
4).
[Table 4 about here.]
4.1.3. Banks equity index based on average returns (BankEQU)
Based on the secondary market, we use the country-wise banking sector equity index.
The index is based on average logarithmic returns of all publicly traded banking firms’
headquartered in a particular country (for the list of banks, please refer to Table 3). The
indices are normalized to 100 (at the beginning of the last quarter in 2004) for all countries.4
4Note that the methodology creates an upward bias in the returns indices due to bank failures, and
must be interpreted carefully. All the result documented in this paper are based on this unbalanced panel.
However, our results are robust to the balanced panel of banks where we only consider banks for which data
is available for the entire period.
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4.1.4. Commonality and differences among banking sector risk measures
Our sample contains Greek, Irish, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish banks. We use quar-
terly data from 2004-Q4 to 2013-Q2 (i.e., T = 35 observations). Table 5 provides summary
statistics of all banking sector credit risk measures. The mean BankDtD ranges from 2.35
for Greece to 4.58 for Spain. The highest variation is observed for Portugal and Ireland,
whereas Greece shows a consistently low level. The median values for Greece and Ireland
are 1.87 and 1.75, reflecting the precarious banking conditions in these countries for our
time period of study.
[Table 5 about here.]
The mean value of BankCDS for individual countries are lowest in case of Italy (1.48%)
and highest in case of Greece (9.64%). We also observe extremely high values for Greece
(24%), Ireland (20%) and Portugal (13.65%). These peaks coincide the period when the
banking crisis was at its highest point (as in the case of Ireland) or when the sovereign
government in these countries lost market access for issuing new government bonds (as in
Greece and Portugal). Also noteworthy is the fact that Irish banks’ CDS spreads before the
crisis were negligible and then shot up within a very short period of time during the crisis.
If we compare this with the BankEQU, we find a similar trend for Ireland. The BankEQU
for Spain and Greece also shows huge gains before the crisis compared with Ireland, Italy,
and Portugal. Post-crisis, however, the Irish and Greek banking sectors show continuous
sign of stress with very low index values.
To study the commonality in different banking sector risk indicators, we compute the
cross-country correlations matrix for each alternative indicator. Since the time series of
observations are not always of equal length, the correlation between each pair of banking
sector risk indicators is based on the common sample. The correlations matrices are shown
in Table 6. To evaluate these results, we use the adjective ‘strong’ for estimated values
included in the interval (2c,1], the adjective ‘weak’ for estimated values included in the
interval (c,2c], and when the estimated values are included in the interval (0,c], we say that
the series is ‘not correlated’. The cut-off point c is chosen because it roughly corresponds to
the null hypothesis that the correlation coefficient is zero at 5% level of significance.5
[Table 6 about here.]
As can be seen, there is evidence of a strong positive correlation between the BankDtD
indicators. Regarding the BankCDS, we also find a strong positive correlation, except for the
case of Ireland with Greece. Finally, and in relation to the BankEQU, we observe a strong
positive association between Greece and Italy, a weak positive correlation in Spain with
Greece, Italy, and Portugal, in Portugal with Greece and Ireland, and between Portugal and
Italy. There is no significant evidence of a correlation between Ireland and Greece, Spain or
5The standard error is approximately T−1/2, T being the sample size. In our case, T = 35 for BankDtD
and BankEQU and T = 22 for BankCDS. Thus the two standard errors would be 0.34 and 0.43 respectively.
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Italy. The highest pair-wise correlations are between BankCDS indices followed by BankDtD
and BankEQU. The average pair-wise correlations are above 0.85 for BankCDS which comes
down to 0.78 for BankDtD. However, the pair-wise correlation in case of BankEQU is ex-
tremely low. We even find a negative correlation between the Spanish and Irish BankEQU.
4.2. Sovereign risk measures
To assess the sovereign credit risk, we also use three different risk measures. Our primary
measure of credit risk is the sovereign DtD indicator as suggested in Singh et al. (2018).
We also use sovereign yield spreads (based on secondary capital market) and sovereign CDS
spreads (from the derivative market). The rest of the section describes the sovereign credit
risk measures in detail.
4.2.1. Sovereign distance-to-default (SovDtD)
Incorporating lessons from the sovereign debt crises in general and from the Greek debt
restructuring in particular, we define the priority structure of sovereigns’ creditors that is
most relevant for peripheral euro-area countries in severe crisis episodes. The basic idea is
that even though de jure there is no explicit seniority to a particular group of creditors,
almost all market participants expect multilateral creditors’ holdings to be senior to private
markets. Rating agencies’ downgrade of euro area countries during the sovereign debt crisis
were also explicitly motivated by seniority issues (see Steinkamp and Westermann (2014)).
The Greek debt restructuring of 2012 also validated this differentiation where we observe
asymmetrical losses across creditors and across debt instruments based on the seniority
of creditors and maturity of different bonds (see, e.g., Zettelmeyer et al. (2013)). Thus,
tranching of the sovereign default risk for creditors based on their seniority pushes the
market-based measures of credit risk gradually towards the riskiness of junior claim holders.
We exploit this market development to define the priority structure of sovereign creditors
based on their place of residence and institutional classification. This classification is used to
define two kinds of sovereign liabilities: senior and junior claims holders. Giving legitimacy
to the current bankruptcy proceedings where the bankrupt entity formally surrenders its
assets to its creditors and sale proceedings are divided among creditors based on the priority
structure of liabilities, we price the junior claims as a call option on the sovereign’s assets.
To this end, we use the market value of sovereign debt in the hands of junior creditors as
the equity value. The value of junior claims is calculated by multiplying the market value of
the sovereign’s total debt with the fraction of the total debt in the hands of junior creditors.
The volatility of the sovereign bond price as provided by the CNMV6 is taken as the direct
measure of the junior claims volatility. To calculate the default barrier (strike price in case
of call option), we use the sum of the general government’s short-term debt (where the
payment is due in one year or less in nominal terms) and half of the long-term debt.
6We use data from the National Securities Market Commission (Comisio´n Nacional del Mercado de
Valores (CNMV)), the agency responsible for the financial regulation of the securities markets in Spain.
These are daily data on bond market volatility which is calculated as the annualized standard deviation of
daily changes in 40-day sovereign bond prices. The quarterly value is then computed as the average of the
last three months daily volatility.
13
An implied value of sovereign assets and its volatility are then estimated using the con-
tingent claims methodology. We calculate a quarterly time series of the SovDtD for Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. For a detailed description of the methodology, refer to
Singh et al. (2018). SovDtD can be interpreted as the number of standard deviation the
sovereign’s assets value are away from its debt obligations. Figure 3 shows the evolution of
SovDtD and BankDtD for each country considered in our analysis.
[Figure 3 about here.]
4.2.2. Sovereign CDS spreads (SovCDS)
We use five-year benchmark sovereign CDS daily mid-quotes from Datastream as the
second measure of sovereign credit risk (SovCDS). These data are available starting at
2007Q4. Following previous studies we focus on the 5-year maturity, as these contracts are
regarded as the most liquid in the market. Figure 2 shows the evolution of SovCDS and
BankCDS for each country considered in our analysis.
4.2.3. Sovereign yield spreads (SovSPR)
To calculate yield spreads for individual countries (SovSPR), we use the Maastricht cri-
terion bond yields (the long-term interest rates). These are the rates used as a convergence
criterion for the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries, based on the
Maastricht Treaty. The series relates to interest rates on long-term government bonds de-
nominated in national currencies. The data are based on central government bond yields
on the secondary market, gross of tax, with a residual maturity of around 10 years. Yield
spreads are calculated as the difference between the ten-year benchmark sovereign bond yield
of each individual country and that of Germany. Figure 4 shows the evolution of SovSPR
and BankEQU for each country considered in our analysis.
[Figure 4 about here.]
4.2.4. Commonality and differences among sovereign credit risk measures
Our sample contains Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain and we use quarterly
data from 2004-Q4 to 2013-Q2. Table 7 provides summary statistics of all sovereign credit
risk measures. The mean SovDtD ranges from 10.94 for Portugal to 18.88 for Italy. The
highest variation is observed for Ireland and the lowest for Portugal. A closer look at the
data shows consistently low values for Portugal, suggesting its vulnerability for our entire
period of study. The minimum value is observed for Greece at 1.43.
[Table 7 about here.]
Comparing this with SovCDS, we find similar trends. If we look at the minimum values
for Spain (0.19%), Greece (0.20%), Italy (0.20%) and Portugal (0.29%), it suggests that
before the crisis financial markets priced the default risk of all peripheral sovereign on a
par with other central European countries. However, with the advent of the sovereign debt
crisis, Greece, Portugal, and Ireland show consistently high CDS spreads (7.94%, 2.86%, and
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2.71% respectively) compared with Spain and Italy. For Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, we
observe huge spikes in CDS spreads coinciding with there loss of market access. For Greece,
since it formally restructured its sovereign debt in 2012, we find consistently high values.
Looking at yield spreads, we find very low levels for countries before the crisis (Ireland has
negative yield spreads for some periods). However, during the crisis, the levels shot up for
Greece (26.51%) and Portugal (11.18%) creating a vicious loop in which high debt cost made
the debt unsustainable, thus increasing the cost of debt further. We see a similar trend for
Spain (5.29%) and Italy (4.88%), but with a less dramatic increase in yield spreads.
To study the commonality between the different sovereign risk measures under study,
we compute the cross-country correlations matrix for each alternative indicator. Since the
time series of the observations are not always of equal length, the correlation between each
sovereign risk indicator is based on the common sample. The correlations matrices are
shown in Table 8. As above, we use the adjective ‘strong’ for estimated values included in
the interval (2c,1], the adjective ‘weak’ for estimated values included in the interval (c,2c]
and, when the estimated values are included in the interval (0,c], we say that the series
is ‘not correlated’. The cut-off point c is chosen because it roughly corresponds to the
null hypothesis that the correlation coefficient is zero at 5% level of significance.7As can be
seen, we find evidence of a strong positive correlation between the SovDtD indicators in all
cases except Italy with Greece and Ireland and Portugal with Ireland and Italy, where we
detect high but weak positive correlations. Turning to the SovCDS, we observe a strong
and high positive correlation between Italy and Spain, but a weak positive correlation for
all other cases except for the pair Greece and Ireland, where no significant correlation is
found. Finally, and with respect to the SovSPR, we observe a strong positive association in
all cases.
[Table 8 about here.]
4.3. Cross-correlations between sovereign and banking sector risk
To study the commonality between sovereign and banking sector risk indicators, we
compute the cross-country correlations matrix for each peripheral euro area country under
study. Since the time series of observations are not always of equal length, the correlation
between each sovereign risk indicator is based on the common sample. The correlations
matrices are shown in Table 9.8 Focusing only on the association between the bank and
sovereign indicators, we find evidence of a weak negative correlation between BankDtD and
SovCDS and SovSPR in all countries except Spain, where no significant correlation between
7In our case, T = 19 for SovCDS, T = 23 for SovDtD and T = 35 for SovSPR. Thus the two standard
errors would be 0.46, 0.43 and 0.34 respectively.
8Once again, we use the adjective ‘strong’ for estimated values included in the interval (2c,1], the adjective
‘weak’ for estimated values included in the interval (c,2c] and, when the estimated values are included in
the interval (0,c], we say that the series is ‘not correlated’. The cut-off point c is chosen because it roughly
corresponds to the null hypothesis that the correlation coefficient is zero at 5% level of significance. In our
case, T = 22 for Greece, T = 19 for Ireland and T = 23 for Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Thus the two
standard errors would be 0.43, 0.46 and 0.42, respectively.
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them is found. There is also evidence of strong negative (Italy and Spain) or high but weak
negative correlation (in the remaining countries) between BankEQU and SovCDS.
[Table 9 about here.]
In the case of Greece, we also observe strong positive correlations between BankCDS and
SovSPR and between BankEQU and SovCDS, Italy and Spain, as well as a high but weak
positive correlation between BankCDS and SovCDS and between BankDtD and SovDtD and
a high but weak negative correlation between BankEQU and SovSPR. For Ireland, we also
observe a strong positive correlation between BankCDS and SovCDS and a weak positive
correlation between BankDtD and SovDtD and between BankCDS and SovSPR, while no
significant correlation is found between BankEQU and either SovDtD or SovSPR. In the case
of Italy, we also detect strong positive correlations between BankCDS and both SovCDS and
SovSPR, as well as a high but weak positive correlation between BankDtD and SovDtD and
between SovDtD and SovSPR, and a strong negative correlation between BankEQU and
SovSPR. Finally, for Spain, we also observe a strong positive correlation between BankCDS
and both SovCDS and SovSPR and a strong negative correlation between BankEQU and
SovSPR, while no significant correlation is found between BankDtD and either SovCDS or
SovDtD or SovSPR.
5. Methodology: Assessing interconnection
We use several econometric techniques to assess the interconnection between the banking
sector and sovereign credit risk indicators without modelling the details of the entire network
structure. We show that just by including the banks and sovereign credit risk indicators,
one can disentangle the inherent contagiousness and vulnerability of the interdependent
structure. We use three different sets of indicators for comparison. BankDtD and SovDtD
are our primary indicators. The detailed presentation of our results is based on these primary
indicators which take into account both the market and balance sheet based information.
For comparison, we use secondary market indicators - SovSPR and BankEQU, together
with derivative markets measures - SovCDS and BankCDS - for each individual country.
An increase in interdependence across all markets will be considered as a robust estimate of
our interconnection measures.
5.1. Principal component analysis
To measure the commonality among the sovereign and banking sector credit risk indices,
we use Principal Component Analysis (PCA), a technique in which the credit risk of all
institutions (individual sovereigns and their banking sector) is decomposed into orthogonal
factors of decreasing explanatory power (refer to Muirhead (1982) for detailed exposition).
We follow Billio et al. (2012). More formally, let Ci be the credit risk of institution i,
i = 1, 2, 3, .., N . Let E[Ci] = µi and V ar[Ci] = σi, then the variance of the system σS will
be,
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σ2S =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
σiσjE[RiRj]
where, Rk is the standardized credit risk of institution k given by Rk ≡ (Ck−µk)/σk for
k = i, j. We now introduce N zero-mean uncorrelated variables ζk for which,
E[ζkζl] =
{
λk, if k = l
0, if k 6= l
and all the higher order co-movements are equal to those of Ri’s, where λk is the k-th
eigenvalue. We express the Ri’s as a linear combination of the ζk’s
Ri =
N∑
k=1
Likζk
where Lik represents the factor loadings for ζk for an institution i. Thus, we have
E[RiRj] =
N∑
k=1
N∑
l=1
LikLjlE[ζk, ζl] =
N∑
k=1
LikLjkλk
σ2S =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
N∑
k=1
σiσjLikLjkλk
PCA yields the decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of the credit risk mea-
sures into the orthogonal matrix of loadings L (eigenvectors of the correlation matrix) and
the diagonal matrix of eigenvalues Λ. Usually, the first few eigenvalues (denoted by n)
explain most of the variation of the system. This subset captures a larger proportion of
variations when a majority of credit risk indices move together, as is often associated with
stress episodes. Therefore, periods in which few principal components (PCs) explains more
than a fraction H of the total variation are indicative of the increase in interconnection.
To classify periods of increasing interdependence, we define Ω =
∑N
k=1 λk and ω =∑n
k=1 λk as the total risk of the system and the risk associated with the first n PC re-
spectively. The ratio of the two above values can be defined as “Cumulative Risk Fraction
(CRF)” to capture the periods of increased interconnection:
CRF =
ω
Ω
When the system is highly interconnected, a small number n of N principal components
can explain most of the variation in the system. By examining the time variation in the
magnitudes of CRF, we will be able to detect increasing correlations between institutions,
i.e., increased linkages and integration as well as similarities in risk exposures, which can
contribute to systemic risk. We also compute a matrix which calculates the proportion of
the variance in each original variable Ci accounted for by the first n factor, which is given
by the sum of the squared factor loadings.
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5.2. Granger causality
In this subsection, we present two measures of interconnection based on linear Granger
causality tests to quantify the magnitude and directionality of linkages between banking and
sovereign risk measures. The concept of Granger-causality was introduced by Granger (1969)
and Sims (1972) and is widely used to ascertain the importance of the interaction between
two series. As is well known, Granger causality is not a relationship between ‘causes’ and
‘effects’. Rather, it is defined in terms of incremental predictive ability (Hoover (2001)): a
variable Y is said to Granger-cause another variable X if past values of Y help to predict the
current level of X better than past values of X alone, indicating that past values of Y have
some informational content that is not present in past values of X. Therefore, knowledge of
the evolution of the variable Y reduces the forecast errors of the variable X, suggesting that
X does not evolve independently of Y.
Tests of Granger causality typically use the same lags for all variables. This poses a
potential problem since Granger-causality tests are sensitive to lag length.9 In this paper we
use Hsiao (1981)’s sequential method to test for causality in order to determine the optimal
lag structure for each variable, combining Akaike’s final predictive error (FPE, from now on)
and the definition of Granger-causality.10 Essentially, the FPE criterion trades off the bias
that arises from the under-parametrization of a model against a loss in efficiency resulting
from its over-parametrization, removing the ambiguities of the conventional procedure.
Consider the following models,
Xt = α0 +
m∑
i=1
δiXt−i + t (5)
Xt = α0 +
m∑
i=1
δiXt−i +
n∑
j=1
γjYt−j + t (6)
where Xt and Yt are stationary variables (i.e., they are I(0) variables). The following
steps are used to apply Hsiao’s procedure for testing Granger-causality:
1. Treat Xt as a one-dimensional autoregressive process (5), and compute its FPE with
the order of lags m varying from 1 to m. Choose the order which yields the smallest
FPE, say m,11 and denote the corresponding FPE as FPEX(m, 0).
2. Treat Xt as a controlled variable with m number of lags, and treat Yt as a manipulated
variable as in (6). Compute again the FPE of (6) by varying the order of lags of Yt
9The general principle is that shorter lag lengths have smaller variance but run a risk of bias, while longer
lags reduce the bias problem but may lead to inefficiency.
10Thornton and Batten (1985) show that Akaike’s FPE criterion performs well relative to other statistical
techniques.
11FPEX(m, 0) is computed using the formula: FPEX(m, 0) =
(T+m+1)SSR
(T−m−1)T where T is the total number
of observations and SSR is the sum of squared residuals of OLS regression (5).
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from 1 to n, and determine the order which gives the smallest FPE, say n, and denote
the corresponding FPE as FPEX(m,n).
12
3. Compare FPEX(m, 0) with FPEX(m,n) (i.e., compare the smallest FPE in step 1 with
the smallest FPE in step 2). If FPEX(m,0) > FPEX(m,n), then Yt is said to cause Xt.
If FPEX(m,0) < FPEX(m,n), then Xt is an independent process.
4. Repeat steps 1 to 2 for the Yt variable, treating Xt as the manipulated variable.
When Xt and Yt are not stationary variables, but are first-difference stationary (i.e., they
are I(1) variables) and cointegrated (see Dolado et al. (1990)), it is possible to investigate
the existence of Granger-causal relationships from ∆Xt to ∆Yt and from ∆Yt to ∆Xt, using
the following error correction models:
∆Xt = α0 +
m∑
i=1
δi∆Xt−i + t (7)
∆Xt = α0 + βZt−1 +
m∑
i=1
δi∆Xt−i +
n∑
j=1
γj∆Yt−j + t (8)
where Zt is the OLS residual of the cointegrating regression (Xt = µ + λYt), known as
the error-correction term. Note that, if Xt and Yt are I(1) variables but are not cointegrated,
then β in (8) is assumed to be equal to zero.
In both cases (i.e., Xt and Yt are I(1) variables, and they are or are not cointegrated), we
can use Hsiao’s sequential procedure substituting Xt with ∆Xt and Yt with ∆Yt in steps 1
to 4), as well as substituting expressions (5) and (6) with equations (7) and (8). Proceeding
in this way, we ensure efficiency since the system is congruent and encompassing (Hendry
and Mizon (1999)).
Once the directionality of Granger causal linkage is established, we define the following
measure of causality:
Y → X =
{
1, if Y Granger causes X
0, otherwise
and define Y → Y ≡ 0. This measure is then used to define the network-based measure of
interconnection between the N banking and sovereign risk indicators. We define the Degree
of Granger Causality (DGC) for a risk indicator as the fraction of statistically significant
Granger-causality linkages with the rest (N − 1) of the risk indicators. For example, if the
banking sector risk indicator of Italy Granger causes m other risk indicators in our sample,
then DGC = (m/(N − 1)).
12FPEX(m,n) is computed using the formula: FPEX(m,n) =
(T+m+n+1)SSR
(T−m−n−1)T where T is the total
number of observations and SSR is the sum of squared residuals of OLS regression (6).
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5.3. Diebold-Yilmaz’s connectedness measure
To explore further the systemic underlying component among various credit risk indices,
we use the VAR (vector auto regression) methodology based measure of connectedness pro-
posed by Diebold-Yilmaz. The connectedness is based on the decomposition of the forecast
error variance, which is briefly described here. For a multivariate time series, the forecast
error variance decomposition works as follows: first, we fit a standard VAR model to the
series; secondly, using series data up to and including time t, we establish an H period ahead
forecast (up to time t + H); and finally, we decompose the forecast error variance for each
component with respect to shocks from the same or other components at time t.
Consider an N-dimensional covariance-stationary data-generating process (DGP) with
orthogonal shocks:
xt = Θ(L)ut, Θ(L) = Θ0 + Θ1L+ Θ2L
2 + ..., E(ut, u
′
t) = I
Note that Θ0 need not be diagonal. All aspects of connectedness are contained in this very
general representation. Contemporaneous aspects of connectedness are summarized in Θ0
and dynamic aspects in Θ1,Θ2, ... Transformation of Θ1,Θ2, ... via variance decompositions
is needed to reveal and compactly summarize connectedness. Let us denote by dHij the ij-th
H-step variance decomposition component (i.e., the fraction of variable i’s H-step forecast
error variance due to shocks in variable j). The connectedness measures are based on the
“non-own”, or “cross”, variance decompositions, dHij , i, j = 1, ..., N, i 6= j.
Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) propose several connectedness measures built from pieces of
variance decompositions in which the forecast error variance of variable i is decomposed into
parts attributed to the various variables in the system. Here we provide a snapshot of their
connectedness index. They propose a connectedness table such as Table 10 to understand
the various connectedness measures and their relationships. Its main upper-left NxN block,
which contains the variance decompositions, is called the “variance decomposition matrix,”
and is denoted by DH = [dij]. The connectedness table increases D
H with a rightmost
column containing row sums, a bottom row containing column sums, and a bottom-right
element containing the grand average, in all cases for i 6= j.
[Table 10 about here.]
The off-diagonal entries of DH are the parts of the N forecast-error variance decom-
positions of relevance from a connectedness perspective. In particular, the gross pairwise
directional connectedness from j to i is defined as follows:
CHi←j = d
H
ij
Since in general CHi←j 6= CHj←i the net pairwise directional connectedness from j to i, can
be defined as:
CHij = C
H
j←i − CHi←j
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Regarding the off-diagonal row sums in Table 10, they give the share of the H-step
forecast-error variance of variable xi coming from shocks arising in other variables (all other,
as opposed to a single other), while the off-diagonal column sums provide the share of
the H-step forecast-error variance of variable xi going to shocks arising in other variables.
Hence, the off-diagonal row and column sums, labelled “from” and “to” in the connectedness
table, offer the total directional connectedness measures. In particular, total directional
connectedness from others to i is defined as
CHi←• =
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
dHij
The total directional connectedness to others from i is defined as
CH•←i =
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
dHji
We can also define net total directional connectedness as
CHi = C
H
•←i − CHi←•
Finally, the grand total of the off-diagonal entries in DH (equivalently, the sum of the
“from” column or “to” row) measures total connectedness:
CH =
1
N
N∑
i,j=1,j 6=i
dHij
For the case of non-orthogonal shocks the variance decompositions are not as easy to
calculate as before, because the variance of a weighted sum is not an appropriate sum of
variances; in this case methodologies for providing orthogonal innovations like traditional
Cholesky-factor identification, may be sensitive to ordering. So, following Diebold and
Yilmaz (2014), a generalized VAR decomposition (GVD), invariant to ordering, proposed
by Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998) will be used. The H-step generalized
variance decomposition matrix is defined as DgH = [dgHij ], where
dgHij =
σ−1ij
∑H−1
h=0 (e
′
iΘh
∑
ej)∑H−1
h=0 (e
′
iΘh
∑
Θ
′
hej)
In this case, ej is a vector with j
th element unity and zeros elsewhere, Θh is the coefficient
matrix in the infinite moving-average representation from VAR,
∑
is the covariance matrix
of the shock vector in the non-orthogonalized-VAR, σij being its j
th diagonal element. In this
GVD framework, the lack of orthogonality means that the rows of do not have sum unity and,
in order to obtain a generalized connectedness index D˜g = [d˜gij], the following normalization
is necessary: d˜gij =
dgij∑N
j=1 d
g
ij
, where by construction
∑N
j=1 d˜
g
ij = 1 and
∑N
i,j=1 d˜
g
ij = N .
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The matrix D˜g = [d˜gij] permits us to define concepts similar to the ones defined above
for the orthogonal case, that is, total directional connectedness, net total directional con-
nectedness and total connectedness.
6. Empirical results
6.1. Principal components analysis (PCA)
To measure the commonality between sovereign and banking sector credit risk indices,
we apply the PCA methodology as discussed in Section 5. However, since PCA seeks
to maximize the variance and so is sensitive to scale differences in the variables, we first
normalize the data and work with correlations rather than covariance between the original
variables. The explanatory power of the first three PCs are shown in Figure 5. The graph
suggests that, on average, the first three PCs explain more than 90% of the total variation
of DtD risk indices at all time periods, but the importance of individual component varies
drastically across time.
[Figure 5 about here.]
The first principal component is very dynamic and captures between 43% to 93% of the
variation in credit risk. Starting from a low level of roughly 45%, it starts to increase rapidly
in 2008. We see a very rapid increase in the first half of 2008, followed by a gradual upward
movement till the second quarter of 2009. We observe the highest interconnection between
indices in 2009-Q2, when the first PC accounts for roughly 93% of the total variation. This
period coincides with the adverse market development across the global financial markets
encompassing both the Lehman Brothers and the AIG defaults, followed by the bailout of
the six main Irish banks. Very soon afterwards, Greece declared the true nature of its fiscal
deficits. From beginning 2009-Q3, the explanatory power of the first PC started to come
down, falling as low as 49% by the end of 2011. In the last ten quarters, it has stabilized
around 57% with minor variations. However, note that this level is roughly 12% points
higher than its pre-crisis level.
We see a similar trend in the second and third PCs. Most of the gains in the explanatory
power of the first PC came from an equal reduction in the explanatory power of second and
third PCs. The cumulative explanatory power also increased for the first three component
in times of the global financial crisis and together they were able to explain roughly 97% of
the variation at the peak of the crisis. Table 11 tabulates the percentage variation explained
by the first three PCs for the full sample, pre-crisis period and crisis period. The choice of
pre-crisis and crisis period is exogenous based on previous studies. As can be seen, the first
and second components show better explanatory power in the pre-crisis period and explain
90% of the total variation compared with the crisis period (72%). The results are in-line
with the findings of Beirne and Fratzscher (2013), who showed that idiosyncratic differences
in the economic fundamentals explain a substantially higher share of the movements and
cross-country differences in sovereign risk post-2008 crisis than in the pre-crisis period.
[Table 11 about here.]
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Table 12 documents the proportion of the variance in each original variable credit risk
index accounted for by the first three factors (calculated as the sum of the squared factor
loadings). Comparing the pre-crisis and crisis period, we note that the first PC explained
around 10 percent of the variance of each index in the pre-crisis period with very low variation
within and across country indices (9% and 13%). However, estimates from the crisis period
suggest huge variation (1% to 19%) during the crisis period. We find a very similar pattern
of variation for the second PC as well. This provides additional evidence of decreasing
interconnection in the crisis period.
[Table 12 about here.]
6.1.1. Comparison with CDS and Yield-Returns
Comparing this with SovCDS and BankCDS, we observe that CDS spreads are driven
across the board with a large underlying factor. On average, the first PC drives more than
80% of the variation. However, since late 2012, the role of the first PC has decreased and the
role of the second PC has grown. This provides suggestive evidence of the increasing role of
country fundamentals in credit risk measures in the post-crisis landscape. The trend is also
very similar to what we observe in the case of DtD, in which increasing higher weight are
given to the second and third PC in total variation. Looking at the interconnection (Part II:
Table 12),13 the crisis period estimates suggest increasing variation across countries in the
explanatory power of first three PCs. This divergence is especially pronounced for Ireland
and Greece compared with the rest of the countries in our sample.
[Figure 6 about here.]
For PCA results based on SovSPR and BankEQU, we observe multiple peaks in the
explanatory power of the first PC. The first peak is observed in the second half of 2009
(coinciding with the confirmation of irregularities in the Greek public finance statistics) while
the second peak coincided with the increasing spreads for Spain and Italy in the second half
of 2011 and early 2012. The explanatory power of the first PC rises from roughly 60% to
90% at the peaks. The gain in its explanatory power comes at the expense of the second PC,
providing suggestive evidence that these indices are extremely prone to market sentiment.
Results based on interconnection (Part III: Table 12), suggest that in the pre-crisis period,
the explanatory power for the first three PCs is quite consistent across countries. However,
in the post-crisis period, we observe high variations, especially for Irish sovereign yield and
the Portuguese banking sector.
6.2. Interconnection based on Granger causality
6.2.1. Static Granger-causal relationships
Regarding the cross-country Granger causality linkages between the sovereign and bank
risk indicators, Table 13 presents the computed degrees of Granger causality (DGC). Refer-
ring to the DtD indicators, our results for the whole sample suggest that the percentage of
13Due to data limitations, we have PCA results for sovereign and banking sector CDS spreads for the
crisis period only.
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statistically significant Granger-causality relationships with the rest of risk indicators ranges
from 0 in the cases of BankDtD in Italy and Spain to 44% and 33% for BankDtD in Portugal
and Greece respectively. As for the SovDtD, the cases of Greece and Portugal stand out
(both with a DGC of 22%). When evaluating the DGC before and during the crisis, in all
cases there is a reduction except for the SovDtD in Greece, Italy, and Portugal.
[Table 13 about here.]
Turning to the CDS risk indicator, our results for the whole sample indicate a greater
degree of Granger causality than with the DtD indicator (except for the cases of SovCDS
in Greece and Spain), with values ranging from 11% for BankCDS in Spain and SovCDS in
Portugal to 44% for both BankCDS and SovCDS in Ireland and for BankCDS in Portugal.
Due to limited data availability, we cannot assess the DGC before the crisis, but the results
for the crisis period are similar to those in the whole sample, except in the cases of the
BankCDS in Italy, Ireland, and Portugal, where reductions are recorded.
Finally, with reference to SovSPR and BankEQU, for the whole sample we find a decrease
in the DGC with respect to the DtD indicators in the cases of SovSPR in Greece, Italy and
Portugal, and for BankEQU in Spain and SovSPR in Italy, Portugal and Spain. When
considering the possible variation of the DGC before and during the crisis, we detect a
decline in the cases of SovSPR in Ireland and Spain and BankEQU in Greece, Ireland, and
Portugal.
6.2.2. Dynamic Granger causality linkages
To understand the time-varying nature of bank-sovereign linkages for individual coun-
tries, we adopt an eclectic approach in order to directly investigate changes in the existence
and the intensity of causality between banking and sovereign risk. To that end, we apply a
dynamic approach to assess the evolving nature of the Granger causal linkages and to detect
episodes of significant and transitory increases in the pairwise Granger causal relationships.
Thus, we look for episodes with evidence of an enhancement in the information content of
one series that significantly improves the explanatory power of the future evolution of the
other series, suggesting a strengthening of their interdependence. We associate episodes
of Granger-causality intensification with episodes of contagion.14As explained above, since
the presence and intensity of Granger-causality may vary over time, we adopt a dynamic
analysis to detect episodes of a significant, short-run abrupt increase in the causal linkages.
To summarize, in Figures 7, 8 and 9 we plot the evolution over time of the difference
between FPE(m, 0) and FPE(m,n) statistics for each individual country based on different
risk measures. These graphs provide us with a view of the dynamic bi-directional influence
between sovereign and banking risks for each peripheral euro country and constitute our in-
dicator of causality intensification based on time-varying Granger-causality analysis, since it
14Using the framework for grading the strength of the Granger-causality relationship proposed by Atukeren
(2005), we obtain the same classification of episodes of intensification. Atukeren (2005)’s framework uses
Poskitt and Tremayne (2013)’s posterior odds ratio test and Jeffreys (1961)’s Bayesian concept of grades of
evidence.
24
illustrates the changes in the directions and magnitudes over time. In Table 14 we summarize
the causality intensification episodes for our full sample period. Note that if the difference
is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in the case of, say, the banking to
sovereign risk relationship, this indicates the existence of a significant, transitory increase
in the Granger-causality relationship running from country banking risk towards sovereign
risk. Note that in the cases of the banking sector equity index and sovereign yield spreads,
we do not detect any causality intensification episodes, either from bank to sovereign or from
sovereign to bank.
[Figure 7 about here.]
[Figure 8 about here.]
[Figure 9 about here.]
[Table 14 about here.]
Looking at dynamic Granger causality using DtD data for the case of Greece, we find
no evidence of bank-sovereign linkages. We observe complete de-linkage in banking and
sovereign stress from the very beginning of our sample period. These results are supported
by the evidence of the sovereign yield spread and bank equity index data, where we observe a
similar trend. The results of the CDS spreads suggest bank-sovereign linkages developing in
late 2011 and early 2012, coinciding with the beginning of Greek debt restructuring episode.
In the case of Ireland, we see growing Granger causal linkage from banks to the sovereign
in late 2007 and early 2008. However, in late 2008, we see a sudden reversal with a sharp
drop in the interconnection between banks and the sovereign. Given the sudden nature of
market events in Ireland, we find no supporting evidence of risk transfer from banks to the
sovereign, even with yield spread and bank equity index data. For the late 2011 period, we
detect a renewed development of the sovereign to bank nexus in CDS spread data. For Italy,
in the pre-crisis period, we find no directional linkages; however, from mid-2009, we see the
development of uni-directional linkages from sovereign to banks with multiple peaks in late
2009 and early 2011. The CDS spread based analysis shows no such linkages. Yield spread
and banks equity index data suggest complete de-linkage between banks and sovereign risk.
As we have serious data limitations in case of Portugal, our analysis using DtD starts
only from the beginning of the global financial crisis. We observe high uni-directional risk
transfer from sovereign to banks in late 2008 and mid-2011. The analysis based on CDS
spreads suggests the existence of bi-directional linkages in late 2010 and early 2011. The
analysis based on yield spreads and bank equity index suggests no linkages for the entire
period. For the case of Spain, we observe episodes of risk transfer from banks to the sovereign
in late 2009 and early 2010 periods. However, from early 2011, we see evidence of risk transfer
from the sovereign to banks. The period of 2010Q2-2012Q1 supports the existence of doom
loop between the sovereign and banks. Analysis based on CDS spreads also supports the
development of bi-directional sovereign-bank linkages in 2012Q3. However, the yield spread
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and bank equity index based analysis suggests no linkages between banks and sovereign
risks.
Comparing results across different risk indices, we find that the analysis based on DtD
supports the development of bi-directional sovereign-bank linkages in Spain. In the case
of Portugal and Italy, we find uni-directional risk transfer from the sovereign to the banks.
Analyses based on CDS spreads suggest a risk transfer mainly from banks to the sovereign for
Greece, Portugal, and Spain mainly in late 2010 and early 2011. Only in the case of Ireland
do we find evidence of risk transfer from the sovereign to banks (2010Q3). The yield spreads
and bank equity returns data support the absence of linkages between banks and sovereigns.
Finally, Table 13 shows episodes of causality intensification in both directions for Spain,
pointing to an adverse feedback loop between sovereigns and banks and corroborating for
this country, the findings of Singh et al. (2016), where a two-way negative feedback between
sovereign and banks was also detected using sovereign yield spread and BankDtD data.
6.3. Diebold-Yilmaz’s connectedness index
In this subsection, we apply Diebold-Yilmaz’s methodology for assessing connectedness
(Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012, 2014)) among various banking and sovereign risk indi-
cators under study. These connectedness measures are based on forecast error variance
decompositions from vector auto-regressions. The variance decomposition matrix gives us
an intuitively appealing connectedness measure, that is, what percentage of the future un-
certainty in variable i results from the shocks in variable j.
The full-sample connectedness are presented in Table 15. The ijth entry of the upper-left
6× 6 submatrix gives the estimated ijth pair-wise directional connectedness contribution to
the forecast error variance of risk indicator i from innovations to risk indicator j. Hence,
the off-diagonal column sums (labelled “Contribution to others”) and row sums (labelled
“Contribution from others”) give the total directional connectedness to all others from i and
from all others to i respectively. The bottom row (labelled “Net contribution from others”)
gives the difference in total directional connectedness (to-from). Finally, the bottom-right
element (in boldface) is total connectedness.
[Table 15 about here.]
As can be seen, the diagonal elements (own connectedness) are among the largest indi-
vidual elements in the table, ranging from 18.83% (SovCDS) to 59.64% (SovSPR) in the
case of Greece, from 14.86% (BankCDS) to 48.88% (BankEQU) in the case of Ireland, from
21.55% (BankEQU) to 40.89% (BankDtD) in the case of Italy, from 20.71% (BankEQU) to
44.95% (SovDtD) in the case of Portugal, and from 14.76% (BankCDS) to 29.81% (SovSPR)
in the case of Spain. Interestingly, the own connectedness is smaller than most of the total
directional connectedness FROM others, reflecting that these indicators are relatively de-
pendent on each other; that is to say, shocks that affect a particular indicator spread on the
other indicators.
The total connectedness of the sovereign risk indicators varies between 67.45% in the
case of Ireland (indicating that 32.55% of the variation is due to idiosyncratic shocks) to
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78.42% in Spain (suggesting that 21.58% of the variation is due to idiosyncratic shocks).
This result is in line with the value of 78.30% obtained by Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) for
the total connectedness between US financial institutions, but lower than the value of 97.2%
found by Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) for international financial markets.
Figure 10 plots the country-wise net directional connectedness between various risk in-
dices. The plots suggest that, in the case of Greece, SovSPR and BankCDS are net triggers
of shocks while SovDtD and BankEQU are net diffusers of shocks. For Ireland, we find that
SovDtD and BankDtD are net receivers of shocks and for Italy, SovDtD, BankDtD, and
BankEQU. In the case of Portugal, the sovereign risk indicators (SovCDS and SovSPR) are
found to be net transmitters of shocks while SovDtD, BankCDS, and BankEQU are net
receivers. Finally, in the case of Spain, our results indicate that SovDtD, BankDtD, and
BankCDS are net diffusers of shocks.
[Figure 10 about here.]
Comparing across countries, SovDtDs and BankDtD show the least connectedness with
other sovereign and bank risk indicators respectively. This may be suggestive evidence of
the different information content of these indicators based on sovereign and bank balance
sheet information. All risk measures are well connected in each individual country in our
study, suggesting the presence of a common underlying factor. SovSPD turns out to be
the best connected among all sovereign and bank risk indices. SovDtD and BankDtD are
net receivers in each country, suggesting that the increased risk is being driven away from
market-based uncertainty to the idiosyncratic risk factors based on the sovereign and banking
sectors balance sheet vulnerabilities.
7. Concluding remarks
To understand the nature of the sovereign-bank nexus, in this paper we assess the in-
terconnections and their time-varying nature for peripheral euro-area countries. Firstly,
we discuss the nature of these interconnections and the reasons for increasing/decreasing
linkages. We then propose three different econometric techniques based on principal compo-
nent analysis, Granger-causality tests and Diebold-Yilmaz’s connectedness indices in order
to quantify the directional intensity of the interdependence between banking and sovereign
risk measures. Our primary credit risk indicator is a contingent claim model-based distance-
to-default measure for banks and sovereigns. However, for comparison, we use two other
banking and sovereign risk indicators based on the secondary market (sovereign yield spreads
and banking sector equity return) and the derivatives market (banking sector average CDS
spreads and sovereign CDS spreads).
Our results suggest strong connectedness and co-movement between country-level bank-
ing and sovereign risk indicators. We also find evidence of an increasing role of idiosyncratic
risk factors driving the evolution of all risk indices in the post-crisis period, thus supporting
the claims by Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) that the sensitivity of financial market par-
ticipants to fundamental differences increased during the crisis. Country-wise analysis of
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time-varying bi-directional linkages using dynamic Granger-causality suggests the develop-
ment of a bank-sovereign doom loop in Spain corroborating for this country the findings of
Singh et al. (2016). An analysis based on Diebold-Yilmaz’s connectedness index shows the
continuous presence of SovDtD and BankDtD as net receivers of shocks, suggesting that the
increased risk is being driven away from market-based uncertainty to the idiosyncratic risk
factors, which are better captured by the contingent claim based DtD indices.
In view of the robust evidence of the bank-sovereign nexus in peripheral euro-area coun-
tries, we plan to extend our research with an examination of the determinants of increas-
ing/decreasing linkages based on different channels of interconnection, as discussed in Section
3. As membership of the monetary union can have a considerable influence on the banks’
and sovereign credit risk in euro-area countries (see De Grauwe (2012); De Grauwe and Ji
(2013), we will explore the role of fiscal support, central bank interventions and banking
union in the sovereign-bank nexus.
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Table 1: Description of variables
Variable Description Frequency Source
BankDtD Banks average DtD based on the DtD of a sample of banks
headquartered in each country. The list of banks used in the
calculation are shown in Table 3. For detailed methodology,
refer to Singh et al. (2015).
Quarterly Author’s calculation
SovDtD Sovereign DtD. For detailed methodology, refer to Singh
et al. (2018).
Quarterly Author’s calculation
BankCDS Banks average CDS based on 5Y bank CDS (on senior un-
secured bonds) of all banks headquartered in a particular
country for which CDS data is available in Datastream. For
a complete list of bank, please refer to Table 4.
Quarterly Datastream
SovCDS 5Y benchmark CDS spreads for individual countries. Quarterly Datastream
BankEQU Banking sector equity index based on the average returns
of all publicly traded banks in each individual country.
Quarterly Datastream
SovSPR Difference between the 10 year benchmark yield of a coun-
try over Germany.
Quarterly Eurostat
Table 2: Description of variables
Balance sheet variables Source
Total assets As reported in annual/interim reports Bankscope (Code 2025)
Short-term liabilities Deposits and short term funding Bankscope (Code 2030)
Total equity As reported in annual/interim reports Bankscope (Code 2055)
Daily market based variables
Risk-free interest rate Benchmark 10Y bond yield of country
where the bank headquarter is based
Thomson Datastream
Market capitalization Daily closing share price multiplied by
total outstanding share in public
Thomson Datastream
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Table 3: List of banks (by country)
Country Bank name ISIN
Greece National Bank of Greece SA GRS003003019
Greece Piraeus Bank SA GRS014003008
Greece Eurobank Ergasias SA GRS323003004
Greece Alpha Bank AE GRS015013006
Greece Marfin Investment Group GRS314003005
Greece Attica Bank SA-Bank of Attica SA GRS001003003
Greece General Bank of Greece SA GRS002003010
Ireland Depfa Bank Plc IE0072559994*
Ireland Irish Bank Resolution Corp. Ltd. IE00B06H8J93*
Ireland Permanent TSB Plc IE0004678656*
Ireland Bank of Ireland IE0030606259
Ireland Allied Irish Banks plc IE0000197834
Italy UniCredit SpA IT0004781412
Italy Intesa Sanpaolo IT0000072618
Italy Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA IT0001334587
Italy Unione di Banche Italiane Scpa IT0003487029
Italy Banco Popolare Societa` Cooperativa IT0004231566
Italy Mediobanca SpA IT0000062957
Italy Banca popolare dell’Emilia Romagna IT0000066123
Italy Banca Popolare di Milano SCaRL IT0000064482
Italy Banca Carige SpA IT0003211601
Italy Banca Popolare di Sondrio Societa Cooperativa per Azioni IT0000784196
Italy Credito Emiliano SpA-CREDEM IT0003121677
Italy Credito Valtellinese Soc Coop IT0000064516
Italy Banca popolare dell’Etruria e del Lazio Soc. coop. IT0004919327
Italy Credito Bergamasco IT0000064359
Italy Banco di Sardegna SpA IT0001005070
Italy Banco di Desio e della Brianza SpA IT0001041000
Italy Banca Ifis SpA IT0003188064
Italy Banca Generali SpA IT0001031084
Italy Banca Intermobiliare di Investimenti e Gestioni IT0000074077
Italy Banca Popolare di Spoleto SpA IT0001007209
Italy Banca Profilo SpA IT0001073045
Italy Banca Finnat Euramerica SpA IT0000088853
Portugal Montepio Holding SGPS SA PTFNB0AM0005*
Portugal Banco Comercial Portugueˆs, SA PTBCP0AM0007
Portugal Banco Espirito Santo SA PTBES0AM0007
Portugal Banco BPI SA PTBPI0AM0004
Portugal BANIF, SA PTBAF0AM0002
Spain Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA ES0113211835
Spain Banco Santander SA ES0113900J37
Spain Caixabank, SA ES0140609019
Spain Bankia, SA 7 ES0113307021
Spain Banco de Sabadell SA ES0113860A34
Spain Banco Popular Espanol SA ES0113790226
Spain Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo ES0114400007
Spain Bankinter SA ES0113679I37
Spain Renta 4 Banco, S.A. ES0173358039
Notes: ISIN stands for the International Securities Identification Number. An asterisk (*) indicates companies delisted during
the study period. SIFI are indicated in italics (based on Bank of International Settlements G-SIBs as of November 2014).
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Table 4: List of banks with CDS spreads available in Datastream (by country)
Country Bank name ISIN
Greece National Bank of Greece SA GRS003003019
Greece Eurobank Ergasias SA GRS323003004
Greece Alpha Bank AE GRS015013006
Ireland Depfa Bank Plc IE0072559994*
Ireland Irish Bank Resolution Corp. Ltd. IE00B06H8J93*
Ireland Permanent TSB Plc IE0004678656*
Ireland Bank of Ireland IE0030606259
Ireland Allied Irish Banks plc IE0000197834
Italy UniCredit SpA IT0004781412
Italy Intesa Sanpaolo IT0000072618
Italy Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA IT0001334587
Italy Unione di Banche Italiane Scpa IT0003487029
Italy Banco Popolare Societa` Cooperativa IT0004231566
Italy Mediobanca SpA IT0000062957
Italy Banca Popolare di Milano SCaRL IT0000064482
Portugal Banco Comercial Portugueˆs, SA PTBCP0AM0007
Portugal Banco Espirito Santo SA PTBES0AM0007
Portugal Banco BPI SA PTBPI0AM0004
Spain Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA ES0113211835
Spain Banco Santander SA ES0113900J37
Spain Caixabank, SA ES0140609019
Spain Banco de Sabadell SA ES0113860A34
Spain Banco Popular Espanol SA ES0113790226
Spain Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo ES0114400007
Spain Bankinter SA ES0113679I37
Notes: ISIN stands for the International Securities Identification Number. An asterisk (*) indicates companies delisted during
the study period. SIFI is indicated in italics (based on Bank of International Settlements G-SIBs as of November 2014).
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Table 5: Summary statistics of banking sector risk measures
Country Mean Standard Minimum Median Maximum Skewness Kurtosis SE N
Deviation
Average banking sector Distance-to-default measure
Spain 4.58 1.80 2.00 4.42 8.50 0.41 -0.90 0.30 35
Greece 2.35 1.22 0.81 1.87 5.28 0.61 -0.89 0.21 35
Ireland 2.69 2.08 0.49 1.75 7.51 0.87 -0.70 0.35 35
Italy 4.20 1.52 1.96 3.89 7.72 0.26 -1.01 0.26 35
Portugal 3.96 2.06 1.45 3.21 9.58 0.90 -0.07 0.35 35
Average banking sector credit default swap (CDS) spreads
Spain 300.94 157.74 41.99 288.76 549.46 0.11 -1.30 32.89 23
Greece 964.18 757.44 152.05 841.43 2400.79 0.60 -1.05 161.49 22
Ireland 515.82 584.15 6.80 340.70 2025.05 1.05 -0.01 98.74 35
Italy 148.74 155.76 12.87 85.43 493.92 1.03 -0.36 26.33 35
Portugal 306.98 383.41 14.48 99.28 1365.38 1.20 0.23 64.81 35
Average banking sector equity index level (Assuming index level at 100 as on 31st Dec 2014)
Spain 257.71 78.91 100.00 243.67 404.41 0.01 -0.64 13.34 35
Greece 188.69 137.56 15.52 154.56 512.95 0.68 -0.51 23.25 35
Ireland 101.39 63.93 6.72 123.86 188.40 -0.31 -1.53 10.81 35
Italy 128.82 42.73 67.26 120.04 219.96 0.48 -0.82 7.22 35
Portugal 145.61 61.90 49.91 125.87 271.27 0.59 -0.61 10.46 35
Notes: The BankDtD is a measure the number of standard deviations the banking sector assets are away
from its default barrier. Hence, by construction, this is unitless. BankCDS are measured in basis points.
BankEQU are unitless and are in levels.
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Table 6: Correlations between banking sector risk measures
ES GR IR IT PT ES GR IR IT PT ES GR IR IT PT
Average banking sector DtD Banks average CDS spreads Banking sector equity index
ES 1 0.72 0.86 0.75 0.73 1 0.92 0.82 0.94 0.90 1 0.65 -0.34 0.37 0.44
GR 0.72 1 0.84 0.81 0.88 0.92 1 0.73 0.95 0.94 0.65 1 0.05 0.87 0.62
IR 0.86 0.84 1 0.78 0.77 0.82 0.73 1 0.80 0.91 -0.34 0.05 1 0.26 0.38
IT 0.75 0.81 0.78 1 0.84 0.94 0.95 0.80 1 0.91 0.37 0.87 0.26 1 0.67
PT 0.73 0.88 0.77 0.84 1 0.90 0.94 0.91 0.91 1 0.44 0.62 0.38 0.67 1
Table 7: Summary statistics of sovereign risk measures
Country Mean Standard Minimum Median Maximum Skewness Kurtosis SE N
Deviation
Sovereign Distance-to-default measure
Spain 17.72 7.36 5.23 17.52 32.38 0.03 -1.28 1.24 35
Greece 14.39 10.12 1.43 14.25 31.85 0.11 -1.59 1.71 35
Ireland 17.38 8.47 3.76 16.71 35.22 0.18 -1.04 1.43 35
Italy 18.88 7.54 5.73 20.25 31.39 -0.30 -1.13 1.27 35
Portugal 10.94 6.67 2.66 9.15 23.93 0.49 -1.21 1.39 23
Five year benchmark Sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads
Spain 171.86 112.55 18.79 175.41 402.16 0.37 -1.02 23.47 23
Greece 4411.58 6219.48 20.32 794.91 14904.36 0.93 -1.05 1296.85 23
Ireland 345.35 226.63 125.28 271.33 841.86 0.64 -1.03 51.99 19
Italy 168.87 118.58 19.58 141.86 415.01 0.69 -0.77 24.73 23
Portugal 386.25 375.76 28.99 286.05 1170.3 0.89 -0.66 80.11 22
Sovereign yield spreads over Germany
Spain 1.37 1.57 0.01 0.67 5.29 0.87 -0.64 0.27 35
Greece 5.60 7.16 0.19 1.86 26.52 1.21 0.40 1.21 35
Ireland 2.19 2.49 -0.04 1.52 8.54 0.91 -0.41 0.42 35
Italy 1.43 1.40 0.14 0.85 4.88 1.03 -0.23 0.24 35
Portugal 2.76 3.52 0.00 0.77 11.18 1.15 -0.04 0.59 35
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Table 8: Correlations between different sovereign risk measures
ES GR IR IT PT ES GR IR IT PT ES GR IR IT PT
Sovereign DtD measure Sovereign CDS spreads Sovereign yield spread
ES 1 0.92 0.87 0.93 0.87 1 0.73 0.65 0.95 0.89 1 0.96 0.80 0.96 0.91
GR 0.92 1 0.87 0.81 0.91 0.73 1 0.03 0.73 0.55 0.96 1 0.85 0.94 0.96
IR 0.87 0.87 1 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.03 1 0.58 0.82 0.80 0.85 1 0.79 0.88
IT 0.93 0.81 0.75 1 0.71 0.95 0.73 0.58 1 0.89 0.96 0.94 0.79 1 0.93
PT 0.87 0.91 0.70 0.71 1 0.89 0.55 0.82 0.89 1 0.91 0.96 0.88 0.93 1
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Table 9: Country-wise cross-correlations between sovereign and banking risk indicators
Greece BankDtD BankCDS BankEQU SovCDS SovDtD SovSPR
BankDtD 1 -0.83 0.84 -0.69 0.81 -0.77
BankCDS -0.83 1 -0.8 0.72 -0.81 0.95
BankEQU 0.84 -0.8 1 -0.69 0.92 -0.78
SovCDS -0.69 0.72 -0.69 1 -0.63 0.69
SovDtD 0.81 -0.81 0.92 -0.63 1 -0.8
SovSPR -0.77 0.95 -0.78 0.69 -0.8 1
Ireland BankDtD BankCDS BankEQU SovCDS SovDtD SovSPR
BankDtD 1 0.03 0.67 -0.19 0.5 -0.05
BankCDS 0.03 1 0.3 0.91 -0.59 0.9
BankEQU 0.67 0.3 1 0.18 0.21 0.15
SovCDS -0.19 0.91 0.18 1 -0.72 0.92
SovDtD 0.5 -0.59 0.21 -0.72 1 -0.67
SovSPR -0.05 0.9 0.15 0.92 -0.67 1
Italy BankDtD BankCDS BankEQU SovCDS SovDtD SovSPR
BankDtD 1 -0.43 0.42 -0.47 0.61 -0.44
BankCDS -0.43 1 -0.83 0.96 -0.84 0.98
BankEQU 0.42 -0.83 1 -0.83 0.72 -0.84
SovCDS -0.47 0.96 -0.83 1 -0.83 0.97
SovDtD 0.61 -0.84 0.72 -0.83 1 -0.82
SovSPR -0.44 0.98 -0.84 0.97 -0.82 1
Portugal BankDtD BankCDS BankEQU SovCDS SovDtD SovSPR
BankDtD 1 -0.49 0.24 -0.54 0.47 -0.55
BankCDS -0.49 1 -0.58 0.97 -0.8 0.97
BankEQU 0.24 -0.58 1 -0.62 0.46 -0.54
SovCDS -0.54 0.97 -0.62 1 -0.78 0.98
SovDtD 0.47 -0.8 0.46 -0.78 1 -0.82
SovSPR -0.55 0.97 -0.54 0.98 -0.82 1
Spain BankDtD BankCDS BankEQU SovCDS SovDtD SovSPR
BankDtD 1 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.2 0.09
BankCDS 0.01 1 -0.9 0.96 -0.88 0.94
BankEQU 0.06 -0.9 1 -0.88 0.82 -0.88
SovCDS 0.04 0.96 -0.88 1 -0.84 0.96
SovDtD 0.2 -0.88 0.82 -0.84 1 -0.82
SovSPR 0.09 0.94 -0.88 0.96 -0.82 1
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Table 10: Schematic connectedness table
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Table 11: Principal component analysis results
Principal Percentage Percentage Percentage
Component Explained Total Explained Total Explained Total
Full sample Pre-crisis period Crisis period
(2004Q4-2008Q3) (2008Q4-2013Q2)
First 0.7932 0.7932 0.7226 0.7226 0.5101 0.5101
Second 0.0833 0.8766 0.1744 0.8970 0.2128 0.7229
Third 0.0472 0.9238 0.0491 0.9462 0.1302 0.8531
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Table 12: Connectedness based on principal component analysis
Part I: Based on sovereign DtD and banking sector DtD
Full-sample Pre-crisis Crisis period
(2004Q4-2008Q3) (2008Q4-2013Q2)
PC-1 PC-1:2 PC-1:3 PC-1 PC-1:2 PC-1:3 PC-1 PC-1:2 PC-1:3
BankDtD - Spain 0.09 0.40 0.42 0.11 0.22 0.35 0.01 0.27 0.27
SovDtD - Spain 0.12 0.23 0.23 0.13 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.24
BankDtD - Greece 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.24 0.27 0.19 0.22 0.23
SovDtD - Greece 0.12 0.20 0.27 0.12 0.26 0.27 0.13 0.14 0.33
BankDtD - Ireland 0.11 0.28 0.36 0.11 0.18 0.47 0.02 0.39 0.44
SovDtD - Ireland 0.11 0.13 0.44 0.12 0.25 0.26 0.02 0.31 0.52
BankDtD - Italy 0.11 0.14 0.46 0.13 0.18 0.18 0.09 0.11 0.53
SovDtD - Italy 0.10 0.35 0.42 0.10 0.30 0.30 0.19 0.19 0.19
BankDtD - Portugal 0.11 0.13 0.26 0.09 0.18 0.71 0.17 0.17 0.24
Part II: Based on sovereign CDS and banks average CDS
Full-sample Pre-crisis Crisis period
(2004Q4-2008Q3) (2008Q4-2013Q2)
PC-1 PC-1:2 PC-1:3 PC-1 PC-1:2 PC-1:3 PC-1 PC-1:2 PC-1:3
BankCDS - Spain - - - - - - 0.12 0.12 0.26
SovCDS - Spain - - - - - - 0.12 0.13 0.14
BankCDS - Greece - - - - - - 0.12 0.13 0.17
SovCDS - Greece - - - - - - 0.05 0.40 0.54
BankCDS - Ireland - - - - - - 0.07 0.27 0.65
SovCDS - Ireland - - - - - - 0.07 0.36 0.36
BankCDS -Italy - - - - - - 0.11 0.18 0.18
SovCDS -Italy - - - - - - 0.11 0.14 0.28
BankCDS - Portugal - - - - - - 0.12 0.15 0.16
SovCDS - Portugal - - - - - - 0.11 0.13 0.25
Part III: Based on sovereign yield spreads and banking sector equity index
Full-sample Pre-crisis Crisis period
(2004Q4-2008Q3) (2008Q4-2013Q2)
PC-1 PC-1:2 PC-1:3 PC-1 PC-1:2 PC-1:3 PC-1 PC-1:2 PC-1:3
BankEQU - Spain 0.01 0.58 0.58 0.12 0.18 0.26 0.12 0.15 0.25
SovSPR - Spain 0.14 0.15 0.20 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.14
BankEQU - Greece 0.11 0.23 0.24 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.12 0.14 0.19
SovSPR - Greece 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.13 0.17 0.33 0.12 0.16 0.16
BankEQU - Ireland 0.00 0.13 0.68 0.03 0.26 0.52 0.09 0.23 0.23
SovSPR - Ireland 0.12 0.20 0.21 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.05 0.32 0.62
BankEQU - Italy 0.12 0.14 0.19 0.02 0.28 0.37 0.11 0.18 0.25
SovSPR - Italy 0.14 0.15 0.20 0.14 0.16 0.30 0.13 0.13 0.14
BankEQU - Portugal 0.07 0.11 0.33 0.03 0.27 0.31 0.02 0.40 0.83
SovSPR - Portugal 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.12 0.17 0.20
Notes: The table documents the proportion of the variance of each individual credit risk index accounted for by the
first one, two and three principal component (cumulative) for the full sample, pre-crisis and crisis period respectively.
BankDtD and SovDtD represent the average banking sector and sovereign credit risk based on contingent claims
analysis as documented in Section 3. The sovereign credit risk of Portugal is only available starting 2007Q3 and
so is not included in the calculation. For the sake of comparison, the crisis periods also exclude the Portuguese
sovereign credit risk in PCA calculation. BankCDS and SovCDS represent the average banking sector CDS and
sovereign CDS as observed in the market. The CDS data for the full sample starts at 2008Q4. Therefore for CDS,
we report PCA analysis only for the crisis period. BankEQU and SovSPR represents the average returns based
banking sector index and sovereign yield spreads as documented in Section 3.
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Table 13: Degree of Granger causality (DGC) based on static Granger causality linkages
Between banking sector DtD and sovereign DtD indices
Full sample Pre-crisis Crisis
(2004Q4-2013Q2) (2004Q4-2008Q3) (2008Q4-2013Q2)
BankDtD - Spain 0.00 0.13 0.11
SovDtD - Spain 0.11 0.00 0.00
BankDtD - Greece 0.33 0.13 0.11
SovDtD - Greece 0.22 0.00 0.11
BankDtD - Ireland 0.11 0.13 0.00
SovDtD - Ireland 0.11 0.00 0.00
BankDtD - Italy 0.00 0.25 0.00
SovDtD - Italy 0.11 0.00 0.11
BankDtD - Portugal 0.44 0.50 0.00
SovDtD - Portugal 0.22 0.00 0.22
Between banking sector CDS and sovereign CDS indices
Full sample Pre-crisis Crisis
(2004Q4-2013Q2) (2004Q4-2008Q3) (2008Q4-2013Q2)
BankCDS - Italy 0.22 - 0.11
SovCDS - Italy 0.33 - 0.33
BankCDS - Spain 0.11 - 0.11
SovCDS - Spain 0.00 - 0.00
BankCDS - Greece 0.33 - 0.33
SovCDS - Greece 0.00 - 0.00
BankCDS - Ireland 0.44 - 0.22
SovCDS - Ireland 0.44 - 0.44
BankCDS - Portugal 0.44 - 0.22
SovCDS - Portugal 0.11 - 0.11
Between sovereign yield spreads and banking sector equity index
Full sample Pre-crisis Crisis
(2004Q4-2013Q2) (2004Q4-2008Q3) (2008Q4-2013Q2)
BankEQU - Spain 0.11 0.67 0.00
SovSPR - Spain 0.00 0.44 0.33
BankEQU - Greece 0.00 0.67 0.00
SovSPR - Greece 0.11 0.00 0.11
BankEQU - Ireland 0.11 0.56 0.22
SovSPR - Ireland 0.44 0.44 0.33
BankEQU - Italy 0.11 0.44 0.00
SovSPR - Italy 0.00 0.00 0.22
BankEQU - Portugal 0.00 0.56 0.00
SovSPR - Portugal 0.33 0.00 0.56
Notes: The numbers represent the Degree of Granger causality (DGC) as discussed in Section 5.2
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Table 14: Episodes of causality intensification
Based on banking sector DtD and sovereign DtD
Period Banks to Sovereign Sovereign to Banks
2008Q3 Portugal
2009Q4 Spain
2010Q3 Italy
2011Q2 Spain
Based on banking sector CDS and sovereign CDS
Period Banks to Sovereign Sovereign to Banks
2010Q3 Ireland
2010Q4 Portugal
2011Q1 Portugal
2011Q3 Greece
2011Q4 Greece
2012Q4 Spain
Based on banking sector equity index and sovereign yield spreads
Period Banks to Sovereign Sovereign to Banks
Notes: This table shows the episodes of Granger-causality intensification (contagion) and
the corresponding time period for the peripheral euro area countries. We do not detect any
episodes of short-term causality intensification for analysis with sovereign yield spreads and
banking sector equity indices.
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Table 15: Total connectedness between banking and sovereign risk indicators
Contribution
Spain SovDtD SovCDS SovSPR BankDtD BankCDS BankEQU from others
SovDtD 14.88 21.66 23.52 11.49 11.53 16.93 85.12
SovCDS 11.86 27.52 28.52 4.42 12.69 14.99 72.48
SovSPR 11.92 27.35 29.81 4.64 12.41 13.88 70.19
BankDtD 10.08 16.14 23.08 21.20 15.67 13.82 78.80
BankCDS 10.54 24.49 27.58 8.48 14.76 14.15 85.24
BankEQU 15.53 22.85 20.91 8.41 10.98 21.33 78.67
Contribution to others 80.11 80.35 80.57 63.84 81.09 77.58
Net contribution -5.01 7.86 10.38 -14.96 -4.16 -1.10 Total = 78.42
Contribution
Greece SovDtD SovCDS SovSPR BankDtD BankCDS BankEQU from others
SovDtD 24.65 8.73 20.63 8.01 12.18 25.79 75.35
SovCDS 0.98 18.83 22.54 25.09 31.70 0.86 81.17
SovSPR 3.64 13.00 43.06 11.33 21.05 7.92 56.94
BankDtD 5.41 19.25 19.81 26.72 26.81 2.01 73.28
BankCDS 4.07 6.95 52.30 11.69 19.97 5.01 80.03
BankEQU 19.04 4.85 33.02 4.61 8.83 29.65 70.35
Contribution to others 57.34 73.70 77.50 69.45 83.43 58.38
Net contribution -18.01 -7.46 20.56 -3.83 3.40 -11.97 Total = 72.85
Contribution
Ireland SovDtD SovCDS SovSPR BankDtD BankCDS BankEQU from others
SovDtD 34.41 26.39 22.58 6.00 2.34 8.29 65.59
SovCDS 12.35 29.92 28.53 14.25 3.77 11.18 70.08
SovSPR 13.48 16.34 31.79 3.18 17.01 18.20 68.21
BankDtD 4.01 23.13 15.79 35.44 7.33 14.28 64.56
BankCDS 8.55 20.25 29.97 8.45 14.86 17.93 85.14
BankEQU 0.27 3.63 24.23 1.86 21.13 48.88 51.12
Contribution to others 52.92 75.00 79.21 48.76 77.64 58.84
Net contribution -12.68 4.91 11.00 -15.79 -7.50 7.72 Total = 67.45
Contribution
Italy SovDtD SovCDS SovSPR BankDtD BankCDS BankEQU from others
SovDtD 22.67 16.37 16.08 9.96 16.88 18.04 77.33
SovCDS 7.94 24.17 24.63 3.22 24.94 15.09 75.83
SovSPR 9.26 23.69 24.90 2.40 24.68 15.06 75.10
BankDtD 20.32 6.91 5.09 40.89 7.04 19.75 59.11
BankCDS 8.61 23.95 24.83 2.52 25.00 15.08 75.00
BankEQU 14.48 18.60 17.31 9.30 18.76 21.55 78.45
Contribution to others 72.77 78.74 77.93 40.13 78.69 79.39
Net contribution -4.55 2.91 2.84 -18.99 3.69 0.94 Total = 73.47
Contribution
Portugal SovDtD SovCDS SovSPR BankDtD BankCDS BankEQU from others
SovDtD 44.95 14.36 11.51 7.33 6.49 15.37 55.05
SovCDS 11.43 22.06 27.31 17.72 15.28 6.21 77.94
SovSPR 14.30 21.36 26.52 16.61 14.76 6.45 73.48
BankDtD 5.39 23.37 23.13 32.27 7.45 8.39 67.73
BankCDS 20.81 16.46 20.06 9.96 25.44 7.27 74.56
BankEQU 12.86 21.68 18.88 14.69 11.78 20.11 79.89
Contribution to others 59.04 81.51 79.19 67.26 68.67 68.48
Net contribution 3.98 3.57 5.71 -0.46 -5.89 -11.41 Total = 71.44
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Figure 1: Direct linkages between sovereign and financial institutions
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Figure 2: Banking sector average CDS spreads vs Sovereign CDS spreads
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Figure 3: Banking sector average DtD (BankDtD) vs Sovereign DtD (SovDtD)
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Figure 4: Banking sector equity index (BankEQU) vs Sovereign yield spreads (SovSPR)
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Figure 5: PCA of the normalized indices of sovereign and banking sector credit risk for peripheral euro area
countries (2007Q1-2013Q2)
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Notes: The figure plots the Cumulative Risk Fraction based on PCA of quarterly sovereign and banking
sector credit risk indices based on ten quarter rolling window estimates. The yellow, red and blue areas
correspond to the fraction of total variance explained by the first, the second and the third principal
component respectively. The horizontal lines represent the same fraction using full-sample estimates.
Figure 6: PCA based on alternative sovereign and banking sector risk indices for peripheral euro area
countries
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(a) Based on Sovereign and Banking sector CDS
(2011Q1-2013Q2)
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(b) Based on sovereign yield spreads and banking sec-
tor equity index (2007Q1-2013Q2)
Notes: Figure (a) plots the Cumulative Risk Fraction based on PCA of quarterly sovereign and average
banking sector CDS indices based on ten quarter rolling window estimates. Figure (b) plots the Cumulative
Risk Fraction based on PCA of quarterly sovereign yield spreads and banking sector equity index based on
ten quarter rolling window estimates. The yellow, red and blue areas correspond to the fraction of total
variance explained by the first, the second and the third principal component respectively. The horizontal
lines represent the same fraction using full-sample estimates.
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Figure 7: Bi-directional bank-sovereign linkages using dynamic Granger causality (based on sovereign and
banking sector DtD indices)
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Notes: The blue dotted line represents dynamic Granger causality from sovereign to banks and that the
solid red line represents dynamic Granger causality from banks to sovereign.
48
Figure 8: Bi-directional bank-sovereign linkages using dynamic Granger causality (based on sovereign and
banking sector CDS indices)
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Notes: The blue dotted line represents dynamic Granger causality from sovereign to banks and that the
solid red line represents dynamic Granger causality from banks to sovereign.
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Figure 9: Bi-directional bank-sovereign linkages using dynamic Granger causality (based on sovereign yield
spreads and banking sector equity index)
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Notes: The blue dotted line represents dynamic Granger causality from sovereign to banks and that the
solid red line represents dynamic Granger causality from banks to sovereign.
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Figure 10: Country-wise net pairwise directional connectedness between sovereign and banking sector risk
indicators
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Notes: To reflect the intensity of the relationship, we use black, red and blue links for very strong, medium
and weak intensity respectively. For each country, we first order the computed net directional
connectedness values from the highest to the lowest and find the two points that divide the ordered
distribution into three parts, each containing a third of the population. SovDTD, SovCDS, and SovSPR
stand for sovereign DtD, CDS and yield spread respectively. BankDtD, BankCDS, and BankEQU stand
for banking sector average DtD, average CDS and average returns based equity index respectively.
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